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Abstract  
 
Values are assumed to be relatively stable during adulthood. Yet, little research has examined 
value stability and change and there are no published studies on the structure of value change. 
Based on Schwartz’s (1992) value theory, this paper proposes that the structure of intra-
individual value change mirrors the circumplex-like structure of values, so that conflicting values 
change in opposite directions and compatible values change in the same direction. Four 
longitudinal studies, varying in life contexts, time gaps, populations, countries, languages, and 
value measures supported the proposed structure of intra-individual value change. An increase in 
the importance of any one value is accompanied by slight increases in the importance of 
compatible values and by decreases in the importance of conflicting values. Thus, intra-
individual changes in values are not chaotic, but occur in a way that maintains Schwartz’s value 
structure. Furthermore, the greater the extent of life-changing events the greater the value change 
found whereas age was only a marginal negative predictor of value change when life events were 
taken into account. Implications for the structure of personality change are discussed. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Values, value change, personality change. 
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 Values are viewed as primarily stable (e.g., Feather, 1971; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
1997). Indeed, most of the research on values relies on the assumption that values can be used as 
stable personality characteristics. Although value researchers (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
2005b) have noted that values can change, this issue has been largely neglected in theory and 
research in psychology. Moreover, research that has scrutinized value change has examined 
individual values in isolation from other values. This paper builds on our knowledge of the inter-
relationships among values as suggested and confirmed by Schwartz (1992) in examining, for the 
first time, the structure of real-life longitudinal intra-individual value change. Specifically, it 
examines intra-individual value change in natural life settings to see whether values change in an 
organized manner, in which increases in the importance of any value are accompanied by 
increases in similar values and by decreases in conflicting values, thereby mirroring the structure 
of values proposed by Schwartz (1992). 
Values 
 Values (e.g., achievement, security) convey what is important to people in their lives. 
Values affect perceptions, attitudes, and behavior (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). The 
impact of values has been confirmed in numerous studies testing a wide variety of perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviors, from the mundane, such as interrupting people in conversations, to 
important decisions in life, such as career choices (e.g., Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Sagiv, 2002; 
see reviews in Bardi, Calogero, & Mullen, 2008; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Schwartz, & Bardi, 
2001). Because of their wide-ranging influence, values are seen as guiding principles in people’s 
lives that exist across contexts and time, rendering them as relatively stable personality 
characteristics (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1997).  
People differ in the importance with which they hold values. Hence, any value can be 
important to one person and not important to another. People also differ in their personal value 
hierarchies; that is, in the relative importance with which they hold different values. Rokeach 
(1973) and Schwartz (1992) argued that this personal hierarchy of values is crucial in 
determining perceptions, attitudes and behaviors, as most choices contrast at least two values. 
For example, the decision to contribute in a social dilemma game depends not only on the 
absolute personal importance of benevolence values of helping, but also on the relative personal 
importance of benevolence values compared to the personal importance of the conflicting values 
of power (Schwartz, 1996).  
 One of the leading value theories, proposed by Schwartz (1992), defines ten values 
according to the motivations that underlie them. A key feature of this theory is the structure of 
the inter-relationships among the ten values. Specifically, the inter-relationships among these 
values form a quasi circumplex (a circle without specific gradients) of motivational conflicts and 
compatibilities, such that each value shares a motivation with adjacent values in the circle and 
has a conflicting motivation with values on the opposite side of the circle. The ten values and the 
full structure of conflicts and compatibilities can be seen in Figure 1 (see Schwartz, 1992, for a 
detailed explanation of the shared motivation between each pair of adjacent values in the circle, 
as well as for an explication of the motivational conflicts between values). As can be seen in the 
figure, it is also possible to divide the circle into four more general types of values, organized as 
two pairs of conflicting higher order value dimensions (openness to change vs. conservation and 
self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence). 
 It is important to note that values on opposite sides of the value circle are not antonyms; 
thus there is no lexical contradiction between them (e.g., the value item freedom that measures 
self-direction and the value item obedient that measures conformity are located on opposite sides 
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of the circle but they are not antonyms). Rather, their contradiction is based on their conflicting 
motivations. Motivations are considered conflicting if they often lead to opposite behaviors or 
judgment and they are considered compatible if they often lead to the same behavior or 
judgment. To illustrate, if you are asked by your superior to do something to which you object 
you can respond in two opposing ways: comply or not comply. Complying would enable you to 
fulfill your conformity and security values (adjacent values in the circle) while violating your 
self-direction values (opposite values in the circle). Not complying would enable you to fulfill 
your self-direction values while violating your conformity and security values. Hence, the pursuit 
of different values has practical, psychological, and social consequences that may conflict or be 
compatible with one another. Consequently, holding opposite values as highly important is 
bound to cause internal conflicts and may lead to lower well-being. In addition, it may cause 
practical and social problems, as it may lead to inconsistent behavior that may be perceived 
unfavorably by others, at least in Western cultures. Schwartz (1992) contended that, because of 
this, most people value one side of this circle more than the other. Empirically, this results in the 
quasi circumplex structure of inter-relationships between the ten values, which has been 
confirmed in numerous samples around the world (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 2005a). 
Value Change 
 The value literature in psychology has assumed that values are largely stable and, perhaps 
as a result of this, very little has been said regarding value change. In other disciplines, however, 
the topic of value change has received more attention. These include sociology (reviewed in 
Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Spates, 1983), political science (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; McCann, 1997), 
education (e.g. reviews in Chatard & Selimbegovic, 2007; Eccles, Wigfield, Harold, & 
Blumenfeld, 1993), and organizational behavior (e.g., Chatman, 1991).  
 The focus on values as stable in the psychological literature has been important for value 
research because it implies values are largely stable individual-difference variables that can be 
used to predict other personal outcomes. This view is based primarily on the good test-retest 
reliability obtained with value questionnaires (e.g., Schwartz, 2005b).  However, it is possible to 
obtain good test-retest reliability and still observe mean level changes, as has been shown with 
regard to personality traits (Ramirez-Esparza, Gosling, Benet-Martínez, Potter, & Pennebaker, 
2006). This is because a group of people may all shift in one direction while maintaining the 
order of people on the relevant continuum. 
In discussing value change, it is first important to distinguish between different types of 
possible value change, including mean level changes and rank order changes (for more detail see 
Bardi & Goodwin, 2009; for specific instructions regarding the statistical analysis of each type of 
change see Biesanz, West, & Kwok, 2003). Mean level change refers to a change in the mean 
importance of a value across individuals (i.e., mean importance in a sample). That is, a mean 
level increase indicates that the importance of a certain value has increased on average in a group 
of people. Mean level changes are typically the focus of attention in research on value change in 
all of the relevant disciplines, including sociology (see reviews in Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; 
Spates, 1983), political science (e.g., Inglehart, 1997), education (e.g., reviews and findings in 
Chatard & Selimbegovic, 2007; Eccles et al., 1993), and organizational behavior (e.g., Chatman, 
1991), as well as psychology (e.g., Feather, 1975). For example, Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
found an increase in values of tolerance across cultures throughout the second half of the 20
th
 
century.   
Mean level changes in values have been suggested and observed as a function of societal 
changes, such as economic development (e.g., Inglehart, 1997), the impact of an organization on 
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employees (Chatman, 1991), and the impact of educational programs (reviewed in, e.g., Chatard 
& Selimbegovic, 2007). Rokeach (1973) suggested that in addition to culture and societal 
changes, values may change to reflect changes in personal experience. These changes in personal 
experience may also result in mean level changes if different people experience the same 
personal experience (e.g., a historical event that affects the personal lives of all people in society, 
such as war). However, it implies rank order changes if different people experience different 
personal experiences.  
Rank order change refers to a change in the rank order of individuals on a continuum of 
value importance. This type of change is reflected in longitudinal correlations (or test-retest 
reliability/correlations). This is a type of intra-individual change as individuals differ in their 
change of values. That is, the importance of the tested value has increased for some individuals 
and decreased for others. This type of change is of more interest in the discipline of psychology 
than other disciplines, but has been studied mainly to reflect the stability of values (e.g., 
Schwartz, 2005b). We add to this literature, by being the first to examine the structure of change 
in intra-individual value systems, rather than focusing on longitudinal correlations in individual 
values. 
Rokeach (1968) suggested changes in values occur when people experience a state of 
inconsistency between their values and behavior due to new information from a significant other, 
or by realizing there are inconsistencies in their existing values hierarchy. According to Rokeach 
(1968), this leads to a value change to restore consistency. Indeed, Rokeach (1968, 1973) 
developed a successful values change intervention built on this idea. Research using this value 
change intervention is reviewed in Kristiansen and Hotte (1996).   
Schwartz and Bardi (1997) suggested people may adjust their values to fit the 
opportunities in their environment, arguing such change is more likely to occur in young people 
(Bardi & Schwartz, 1996). However, their research used comparisons of cohorts rather than a 
longitudinal design, thus their evidence can only be considered indirect. Similarly, Verkasalo, 
Goodwin, and Bezmenova (2006) used cohort comparisons and found an increase in the 
importance of security values following the 9/11 terrorist attack, although value importance 
subsequently returned to its base-line level. This rebound effect strengthens the validity of the 
adaptation explanation because, as objective security levels returned to pre-9/11 levels, no long-
term adaptation was required. Similar trends were found in an archival study that analyzed value-
words in American newspapers during the 20
th
 century (Bardi et al., 2008). Security values were 
mentioned more often in American newspapers at the beginning of World-War II and during the 
cold war.  
There has also been recent interest in mean level changes in values as a function of age. 
Schwartz (2005b) suggested values may change with age for a number of reasons. First, values 
may change as a result of physiological changes. For example, he suggested hedonism is likely 
to become less important in old age because senses are less sharp and do not enable as much 
physical enjoyment as in young age. Second, values may change to adapt to new life situations. 
For example, Schwartz suggested achievement values are more important in young people as 
they are building their career. Schwartz confirmed these hypotheses, as well as others, in a cross-
sectional study correlating age with values. Similar studies have found converging evidence 
(Puohiniemi, 2002; Verkasalo, Lönnqvist, Lipsanen & Helkama, in press). Schwartz noted, 
however, that such cross-sectional studies cannot disentangle the suggested effects from cohort 
effects. A life-span longitudinal study has not been done yet. Additional possible mechanisms of 
value change are addressed in Bardi and Goodwin (2009). 
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 Most of the research that examined value change using longitudinal designs has followed 
students during their education (e.g., Feather, 1975; Helkama et al., 2003; Sheldon, 2005). The 
changes found ranged from minor changes (e.g., Helkama et al., 2003) to large shifts in values 
(e.g., Sheldon, 2005). In samples with no particular life changes, test-retest reliabilities of values 
were around .90 over a month, and around .60 over two years, indicating stability in values (as 
reviewed in Schwartz, 2005b). However, we propose that, even if there is only a small change in 
values, this change may be systematic and meaningful. 
 There are currently no publications that deal with change in the system of values as a 
whole. The only reference to this issue is Rokeach’s (1973) suggestion that a value change 
entails a change in the whole system of values in the sense that a change in the importance of one 
value should entail a change in the hierarchy of values (the order of personal importance of 
values). Yet, the structure of inter-relationships among values in the Schwartz (1992) model 
raises a question about the inter-relationships among changes in the value system. In other 
words, when values change as part of natural changes in life, do they change in a chaotic or in an 
organized way? Based on the known structure of the inter-relationships among values we 
propose that, when values change, the system of values changes to reflect this quasi-circumplex 
of conflicts and compatibilities. That is, we should find evidence that values change in the same 
direction as their compatible values in the value-circle and in opposite directions to their 
conflicting values in the circle. Hence, the structure of value change should mirror the value 
structure.  
 Some supporting evidence for the general principle of our suggestion originates from 
research on the self. Specifically, shifts in the self towards the individual-self occur at the 
expense of shifts towards the collective-self as a result of experimental manipulations (Gaertner, 
Sedikides, & O’Mara, 2008). 
 A previous study on value change offers some indirect evidence that supports this 
suggestion. Krishnan (2008) followed business students throughout their university studies and 
found a mean level increase in self-enhancement values and a simultaneous decrease in 
benevolence values. However, because the focus of analyses was on mean level changes it is not 
clear whether this pattern also occurred at an individual level, as we suggest in this paper.   
 A more direct support for our expectation can be found in an unpublished study that 
found changing one value in a laboratory experiment resulted in an average change in the same 
direction of values from the same higher-order type and an average change in the opposite 
direction in values from the opposite higher-order type (Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, in 
press). However, Maio et al. (in press) examined value change only in Schwartz’s four higher 
order values, whereas we examined the structure of the more specific ten types of values, 
providing a more detailed picture of value change and its structure. More importantly, Maio et 
al.’s (in press) finding was obtained in a laboratory experiment in which only one value was 
manipulated. In real life, during a period of time such as a year, many different events happen in 
a person’s life that could potentially lead to changes in the importance attached to different 
values and sometimes encourage increases in opposite values. Hence, in real life, it is unclear 
that value change would occur in the organized manner found in a ‘clean’ laboratory experiment.  
 Given this rationalization, it might seem that a chaotic change in values is more plausible 
in real life. Why, then, do we expect a systematic change in the value system in real life? Our 
expectation is based on the nature of the conflicts and compatibilities of values. Many life 
situations confront opposing values or enable compatible values to be pursued at the same time. 
Hence, when a person experiences an increase in two opposing values, he or she is bound to be 
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faced with the same internal conflict repeatedly. To illustrate, let us revisit our previous example 
of an employee being asked by his or her superior to do something objectionable. Recall that this 
situation confronts the opposing values of conformity and self-direction. A person who has 
recently experienced an increase in both conformity and self-direction values is likely to feel 
tension in such situations, as s/he would be torn between the option of complying, which would 
express recently increased conformity values and the option of not-complying, which would 
express recently increased self-direction values. Another possibility may be that the person has 
recently increased the importance of conformity values and decreased the importance of security 
values. Thus, two adjacent values (which share a motivation for maintaining the status quo) have 
become further apart in importance. In this case, the person is likely to be drawn towards 
complying due to the recently increased conformity values and, at the same time, he or she 
would be drawn to the opposite response of not complying due to the recently decreased 
importance of security values. Hence, this situation is likely to lead to an unpleasant internal 
conflict. 
Personal value conflict (as illustrated in the previous paragraph) is also likely to impact 
the perception and judgment of situations and people. That is, a person whose conformity and 
self-direction (opposing) values both increased in importance is likely to feel confused when 
judging another person’s behavior, as behaviors often reflect multiple adjacent values (see 
evidence in Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). Thus, when a person sees a peer at work complying with a 
superior’s objectionable request, s/he is likely to feel some support for the peer’s decision due to 
her/his increased conformity values and, at the same time, feel some discomfort with the peer’s 
decision due to her/his increased self-direction values. This is likely to leave the person torn and 
confused. 
 In the long run, such conflicts are likely to result in decreasing or increasing one of these 
values to avoid recurring conflicts in judgment and in making decisions. This process, however, 
may not happen overnight. A single occurrence of such a conflict may not be sufficiently 
disturbing to change values. But, as the person confronts an increasing number of situations that 
conflict these two values, he or she is bound to feel recurrent discomfort and is likely to be 
motivated to resolve this conflict. This is in line with Schwartz’s (1992) original explanation for 
the emergence of the value circle, with the addition of dynamic changes in values. Hence, if a 
person decides conformity is more important than previously, self-direction will be less 
important than previously. Therefore, after some time, we should be able to observe a systematic 
change in the system of values, such that compatible values change in the same direction and 
conflicting values change in opposite directions. 
 The aim of this paper is to test our proposition regarding the structure of intra-individual 
value change. To examine the generality of the findings, we conducted four longitudinal studies 
that varied in life context, time gaps, populations, countries, languages, and value measures. 
Although some random variance should be expected in examining such a research question, if 
the four studies find essentially the same expected value-change structure, this would provide 
evidence for the proposed structure of intra-individual value change. 
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Study 1 
 The most obvious time to look for value change is during adolescence, as this is often 
thought of as a phase of life with many important changes, including biological, cognitive, and 
social transitions (see reviews in Blonigen, Carlson, Hicks, Krueger, & Iacono, 2008; Steinberg 
& Morris, 2001). Therefore, Study 1 used adolescents. 
Method 
 Participants. 811 (379 girls) high school students from eight schools in Germany and 
neighboring countries1 participated in the study that collected values data at two different times. 
Their average age at Time 1 was 15 (SD = 2). 
 Instrument. At both times, the Portraits Value Questionnaire (PVQ) 40 (Schwartz, 
Lehmann, & Roccas, 1999) was used to obtain the values data. This questionnaire consists of 
descriptions of people in terms of values, such as “He thinks it is important that every person in 
the world be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.” In 
the female version all portraits are formulated in the female form, such as “She likes surprises. It 
is important to her to have an exciting life.” For each one of these statements the respondents are 
asked to answer the question “How much like you is this person?” on a six-point response scale 
ranging from “very much like me” to “not like me at all”. Schwartz (2005b) recommended using 
this value instrument with adolescents, as it does not require the high level of abstraction 
necessary in his original value instrument (the SVS, Schwartz, 1992). The PVQ has been found 
to have good internal reliabilities and good convergence with the original SVS (Schwartz, 
2005b). In this sample, the Cronbach-alpha reliability coefficients were similar to previous 
findings (see, e.g., Schwartz, 2005b); ranging from .47 for tradition to .79 for achievement. 
Ipsatized value scores were used, in which the mean value score of the participant across all 40 
items in the value instrument was subtracted from the value score of each item. This is a standard 
procedure when using the PVQ and SVS instruments (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & 
Kielmann, 2005; Schwartz, 1992, 2005b). It is used because the crucial aspect of each value is its 
importance compared with the other values and because it controls for response tendencies that 
create random variability (see Schwartz, 2005b for more detail). 
 Procedure. All of the schools were visited at the beginning and the end of the school year 
(i.e., nine months apart).  
Analytic Approach. Value-change scores were calculated in two ways to assess the 
structure of value-change in an exploratory and confirmatory analysis. First, the algebraic 
difference between the Time 2 and Time 1 value scores (Time 2 minus Time 1) was calculated, 
in line with Maio et al’s (in press) method of measuring change in values. These value-change 
scores were submitted to a principal components analysis, from which two varimax rotated 
factors were obtained. The structure of the value-change was assessed by comparing the order of 
values in the component plot with Schwartz’s (1992) theoretical structure. This method of testing 
the value structure of Schwartz’s (1992) theory has been successfully used in the past (e.g., 
Cohrs et al., 2005). We used Schwartz’s (1992) criteria for assessing the fit between the expected 
order of the values in the circle and the obtained data. Schwartz (1992) counted the number of 
single inversions of the order of adjacent values (‘moves’) required to rearrange the observed 
order to match the ideal order of values in the circle. When two theoretically adjacent values are 
located as if they ‘interchanged’ places, but are still adjacent to one another, one move is needed 
to reach the ideal order. Because in this paper we have used component plots rather than SSA
2
, 
the order of the values is less clear if a value emerges close to the mid-point of the plot (i.e., the 
crossing point of the axes of the two factors). This raises difficulties in deciding how many 
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moves are needed to reach the ideal structure, when more than one move is needed. Therefore, to 
adapt Schwartz’s (1992) method to the analyses used in this paper, we only distinguish between 
one move and multiple moves. We refer to the former as a small deviation from the theoretical 
structure and to the latter as a large deviation from the theoretical structure. Finding the structure 
of the value-change scores is similar to Schwartz’s (1992) theoretical structure would provide 
support for our theoretical suggestion about the structure of value change. 
Next, the intra-individual difference in the rank order of the importance of the values 
between the Time 2 and Time 1 was calculated, as an alternative value change measure for use in 
confirmatory ordinal multidimensional scaling (MDS). The rank order value-change scores were 
analyzed with and without regional restrictions to compare intra-individual value change with the 
theoretically expected four-quadrant solution representing the tradeoffs between the higher order 
dimensions of self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus 
conservation
3
. The PROXSCAL routine in SPSS was used to compute the confirmatory MDS 
solution (Borg & Groenen, 1997, 2005). Regional restrictions were imposed as a linear 
combination of two theoretically driven facets (see Appendix A) to see whether an acceptable 
MDS solution could be found to separate the values by straight lines derived from the facets. As 
suggested by Borg and Groenen (2005), Kruskal’s Stress measure (Stress 1 in SPSS) for the 
confirmatory or theoretically-constrained solution was compared with the Stress obtained for the 
unconstrained solution. If the theoretically-constrained Stress is not much higher than for the 
unconstrained solution, the theoretical solution is supported (Borg & Groenen, 2005). In this 
case, it is the comparison between fit indices that is important, although a fair fit is desirable. 
According to Kruskal (1971), a stress coefficient of .20 is a fair fit, .10 is a good fit and .00 a 
perfect fit.  
Results 
Descriptive analyses. Table 1 presents the ipsatized mean importance and standard 
deviations of the values at Time 1. It also presents the mean value-change scores and indicates 
the values for which there was a significant paired mean difference between Time 1 and Time 2.  
Specifically, there was a significant mean level decrease in the importance of benevolence (t(807) 
= 4.27, p < .001) and universalism (t(807) = 4.28, p < .001) and an increase in the importance of 
power (t(808) = 6.44, p < .001),  achievement (t(806) = 3.85, p < .001) and self-direction (t(808) = 
2.08, p = .05) values.  It seems individuals in this sample changed in a fairly consistent manner, 
at least in terms of the self-enhancement to self-transcendence dimension. This finding was 
obtained despite the high longitudinal correlations (test-retest) reported in column 3 of Table 1 
that ranged from .58 (for security and self-direction values) to .68 (for conformity values). Such 
correlations are typically considered good test-retest reliabilities, suggesting stability in values. 
Yet, as suggested, even if there are only small changes in values these changes may be 
systematic and meaningful, as was examined next by observing the structure of value change. 
Intra-individual value change. The structure of value change was first examined by 
comparing the algebraic difference (value-change) component scores (Time 2 minus Time 1) to 
Schwartz’s (1992) theoretical structure. The two factor solution representing the openness to 
change vs. conservation and self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence dimensions explained 36% 
of the variance. However, the most crucial aspect of this analysis is the order of the value-change 
variables on the component plot, which can be seen in Figure 2. The order of the value-change 
variables in Figure 2 is very similar to the theoretical model shown in Figure 1. Indeed, there are 
only two small deviations from the theoretical model. The first small deviation shows 
achievement and power values have exchanged locations. As they are very close to one another 
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in the component plot, this change is very small. The second small deviation shows universalism 
and benevolence have changed places. However, the same change occurred in Time 1. In Time 
2, universalism and benevolence were in the correct order, but very close to one another on the 
component plot. Hence, the universalism and benevolence change in the structure of value-
change is in line with a-priori expectations. Similar small deviations from the theoretical 
structure have been commonly found in other studies. Indeed, Schwartz (1992) reported that only 
one of 40 samples examined matched the theoretical structure perfectly. 
Next, the structure of value change was examined by comparing the MDS results for the 
two-dimensional unconstrained and theoretically-constrained MDS solutions based on rank order 
value-change scores. The theory-consistent configuration produced a Stress of .074, which was 
only slightly larger than the unconstrained solution which produced a Stress of .068. In addition, 
the Dispersion Accounted for (DAF) and Tucker’s Coefficient of Congruence were above .99 in 
both cases. The extremely small difference in Stress supports the acceptability of the theory-
consistent solution.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 report the final two-dimensional theoretically-
constrained coordinates. The projection of points onto parallel lines representing each facet and 
the regional spacing of the values supports Schwartz’s higher order dimensions. In this case, only 
one value, tradition, was borderline. However, its decomposed raw stress score was less than .01, 
providing a very small contribution to overall Stress. Thus, the rank order value-change data 
supports Schwartz’s (1992) higher-order theoretical structure.  
Discussion 
 As expected, we found that intra-individual value change was in line with the theoretical 
structure of values delineated by Schwartz (1992). In the exploratory analysis, only two small 
deviations between the value-change scores and Schwartz’s theoretical structure were found, one 
of which would be expected, as the same deviation occurred in Time 1. This is remarkable, 
considering the random variance that should be expected in measuring values with a gap of nine 
months. In the confirmatory analysis, the theoretically-constrained MDS solution produced an 
acceptable solution that supports Schwartz’s (1992) higher-order dimensional structure. 
The results support the suggestion that value change follows Schwartz’s (1992) 
theoretically driven structure. That is, the same conflicts and congruities that organize the 
structure of values at a given time also organize its change. Whenever a value is increased in 
importance, values that stem from similar motivations (adjacent in the value circle) tend to 
increase in importance, while values that stem from conflicting motivations decrease in 
importance. 
 These results were found with high school students during a time of change (Blonigen et 
al, 2008). Would the same pattern be found with older participants? In adults, value change 
would be expected primarily during a major change in life, as individuals are likely to adapt to a 
new life situation partly by adapting their values (see Schwartz & Bardi, 1997 for more 
explanation). Thus, in Study 2 we attempted to replicate the results of Study 1 with a sample of 
slightly older adults going through a major life change. 
Study 2 
 The aim of this study was to replicate the findings of Study 1 with older participants from 
a different population, in a different country with a different language and using a different value 
instrument that measures Schwartz’s (1992) model. A major life transition many young adults 
experience in modern societies is the transition to college. Indeed, Sheldon (2005) found changes 
in life aspirations during college. Hence, Study 2 measures change in college students’ values 
from the beginning of their first year to the beginning of their second year.  
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Method 
 Participants. 129 (110 women) students at the University of Kent, UK, participated in the 
study that collected values data at two time points for partial course credit. Their average age at 
Time 1 was 20 (SD = 4).  
Instruments. The 56-item Schwartz Value Survey (SVS, Schwartz, 1992) was used to 
measure values. Each value item is followed by a short definition in parenthesis, for example, 
“EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)”. Participants rate each value as a guiding principle in 
their own life on a 9-point scale from -1 (opposed to my principles) to 0 (not important) to 7 (of 
supreme importance). The asymmetry of the scale reflects the discriminations people naturally 
make in the importance of values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). This asymmetry can be seen as a 
statistical weakness of the scale. However, respondents rarely use the -1 rating, thus any impact this 
asymmetry might have is likely to be minimal (in this sample, only 4% of the participants used the  
-1 rating more than twice and 71% of the participants did not use this rating at all). Further, Lee and 
Soutar (in press) illustrated that this asymmetry has very little impact on correlations. In addition, 
since the scale is widely used, it was important to use it without modifications. Forty four of the 
value items have been found to have nearly equivalent meaning across 47 nations around the 
world (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995) and are used to index the ten types of 
values. The ten values are measured by between 2 (for hedonism values) and 8 (for universalism) 
value items, reflecting differences in the breadth of different values (see Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). 
Many studies with samples around the world have established the SVS has good internal reliability, 
temporal stability, and external validity and that the value scores are not contaminated by social 
desirability (see a review in Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). In this sample, the Cronbach-alpha 
reliability coefficients were similar to previous findings; ranging from .54 for Security to .78 for 
Hedonism. As in Study 1, value scores were ipsatized by subtracting the personal mean of value 
scores to control for individual differences in scale tendencies. 
 Procedure. The surveys were conducted online as part of a mass testing in the beginning 
of the academic year. Time 1 was in the beginning of the first year at university and Time 2 was 
in the beginning of the second year of university. 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive analysis. Table 2 presents the ipsatized mean importance and standard 
deviations of the values at Time 1. It also presents the mean level value-change scores and 
indicates those values for which there was a significant paired mean difference between Time 1 
and Time 2.  In this case, there was a mean level decrease in the importance of benevolence (t(128) 
= 2.25, p = .03) and an increase in the importance of power (t(128) = 2.39, p = .02) values.  These 
sample changes were more limited, but similar in direction to those found in study 1. In addition, 
the longitudinal correlations (test-retest) shown in column 3 indicate good stability in values.  
Intra-individual value change. A principal components analysis of the algebraic value-
change scores was used to assess the order of the 10 value types. The two factor solution 
explained 36% of the variance and corresponded to the openness to change vs. conservation and 
self-enhancement (excluding achievement) vs. self-transcendence dimensions. The component 
plot is shown in Figure 3. The structure of value-change was similar to the theoretical model, 
with two deviations
4
. As in Study 1, universalism and benevolence exchanged places, forming a 
small deviation from the theoretical model. In addition, achievement was located close to the 
mid-point of the plot, creating a large deviation from the theoretical model. And indeed, 
achievement did not load onto either of the two factors. Despite these deviations, the structure of 
value change was close to the expected theoretical structure.  
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The confirmatory MDS supported the acceptability of the regionally constrained theory-
consistent solution. The theory-consistent configuration had a Stress of .19, which was only 
slightly larger than the unconstrained solution Stress (.17). In addition, the Dispersion Accounted 
for (DAF) was .97 and Tucker’s Coefficient of Congruence was .98 in both cases
5
. Columns 4 
and 5 of Table 2 report the final two-dimensional theoretically-constrained coordinates. The 
projection of points onto  parallel lines representing each facet and the regional spacing of the 
values supports Schwartz’s higher order dimensions. In this case, only one value, benevolence is 
borderline. However, its decomposed raw stress was less than .04. Thus, the rank order value-
change data again supports Schwartz’s (1992) higher-order theoretical structure.  
The results provided further support to the structure of value change. The replication was 
obtained in a different population, in a different country with a predominantly different language 
and using a different value instrument. In both studies, the gap between the two assessments was 
about a year. It is possible that, when change in the values system occurs, it begins with turmoil, 
in which one value change does not immediately lead to the rest of the values in the circle 
changing to fit the first change in value importance. It is possible it takes time for the structure of 
values to change so an increase in one value is accommodated by increases in adjacent values 
and decreases in opposite values. It may be that the time gap of approximately a year meant we 
were able to witness an ‘organized’ value change in which the system of values changed in a 
way that was compatible with the value model. This raises the question as to whether the 
theoretical structure of value change would be found for a relatively short time gap between 
value assessments. Study 3 examined this question. 
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Study 3 
 Study 3 was undertaken to see whether the theoretical structure of value change was 
evident three months after the beginning of a life transition. Unpublished laboratory research 
suggests that we should expect this, as Maio et al. (in press) found manipulating value change in 
a laboratory led to systematic changes in Schwartz’s (1992) four higher order values. Yet, it is 
unclear if this is true in real life, as only one value category was manipulated in the experiment. 
 It was important to keep all of the characteristics of the previous sample the same except 
for one, namely, the time gap. Hence, in this Study, British undergraduate students responded to 
the same value instrument at the same Time 1 used in Study 2 (i.e. the beginning of the first year 
of university studies). However, Time 2 in this study was three months after the beginning of the 
first year. 
Method 
 Participants. 119 (98 women) students at the University of Kent, UK, participated in the 
study for partial course credit. Their average age at Time 1 was 20 (SD = 4).  
 Instruments. As in Study 2, the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey (SVS) was used to 
measure values. In this sample, the Cronbach-alpha reliability coefficients were similar to 
previous findings; ranging from .56 for Self-direction to .81 for Universalism. As in Study 1 and 
Study 2, value scores were ipsatized by subtracting the personal mean of value scores, to control for 
individual differences in scale tendencies. 
 Procedure. The surveys were conducted online. As noted earlier, Time 1 occurred in the 
beginning of the first year of studies and Time 2 occurred 3 months later. 
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Results and Discussion 
Descriptive analysis. Table 3 presents the ipsatized mean importance and standard 
deviations of the values at Time 1. It also presents the mean value-change scores and indicates 
the values for which there was a significant paired mean difference between Time 1 and Time 2.  
In this case, the mean level change in importance across individuals suggested a significant 
increase in universalism (t(118) = 2.24, p =.03) and power (t(118) = 1.99, p = .05) values.  In 
addition, the longitudinal correlations (test-retest) shown in column 3 indicate stability in values.  
Intra-individual value change. The two-factor principal components analysis of the 
algebraic value-change scores explained 33% of the variance in this case. The component plot is 
shown in Figure 4. As in Studies 1 and 2, the structure of value-change was very similar to the 
theoretical structure of values. There were only two deviations from the theoretical structure, one 
small and one large. The small deviation was the same as in Study 1 and Study 2, as the locations 
of universalism and benevolence interchanged. The large deviation was that stimulation was 
located away from hedonism and close to tradition and conformity. Stimulation had low loadings 
on both factors (-.34 and .27, on factor 1 and 2 respectively) and, most unexpected, was its 
negative correlation with the change in hedonism values (r = -.26, p < .01). That is, although 
hedonism and stimulation stem from similar motivations and are, therefore, adjacent in the 
theoretical value circle, in this sample the change in the importance of stimulation was not 
associated with the change in the importance of hedonism values. Still, the structure of intra-
individual value change was generally similar to the theoretical model, suggesting values change 
according to the theoretical model of conflicts and compatibilities, even when change is 
measured after a relatively short gap of three months.  
The confirmatory MDS also provided some support for the acceptability of the theory-
consistent solution. The theory-consistent configuration produced a Stress of .23, which was 
larger than the unconstrained solution which produced a Stress of .15. However, the Dispersion 
Accounted for (DAF) was .95 and Tucker’s Coefficient of Congruence was .97 for the 
constrained solution, compared with .98 and .99 for the unconstrained solution. Further, at least 
some of the Stress for the theoretically-constrained solution was due to the imposed regional 
constraint of hedonism being co-located with the openness to change values, rather than between 
stimulation and achievement, as the Stress dropped to .20 when the Hedonism constraint was set 
free.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 report the final two-dimensional theoretically-constrained 
coordinates. The projection of points onto  parallel lines representing each facet and the regional 
spacing of the values supports Schwartz’s higher order dimensions. In this case, Tradition was 
borderline, however its decomposed raw stress was less than .02. Thus, the rank order value-
change data offers some support for Schwartz’s (1992) higher-order theoretical structure.  
Study 4 
 The three studies presented so far were based on young participants. Values are 
considered as relatively stable variables, consolidating in young adulthood and remaining 
relatively stable throughout life (e.g., Rokeach, 1973). However, Rokeach (1973) suggested 
values may change during adulthood, partly as a result of changes in personal experience. This 
raises the question as to whether the expected structure of value change would be evident in a 
population of adults not necessarily going through a life change, or at least not going through 
similar life changes. Study 4 used an adult sample to examine this issue. We also aimed to 
generalize the results by changing other features of the study. Hence, Study 4 was conducted in a 
different country (Australia), with a different value instrument and with a time gap of two years. 
Further, we examined the possibility that universalism, which consistently switched places in 
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Study 2 and Study 3, was functioning as two value sub-types (nature and social concern), as 
suggested by Schwartz and Boehnke (2004). Finally, we examined possible correlates of value 
change, including major life changes and age.  
 Life changes. It has been suggested values change primarily as a result of life changes 
that require adjustment (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Therefore, we measured 
the occurrence of life changing events to see if the extent of life changes between the times of 
assessment was associated with greater value change. 
 Age. Studies 1, 2, and 3 had homogeneous samples in terms of age. Using a general 
population adult sample (with age ranging from 18 to 67) enabled us to see whether value change 
decreases with age, as previously implied (see Bardi & Schwartz, 1996). 
Method 
 Participants. 135 (72 women) members of an online consumer research panel in New 
South Wales, Australia, took part in the study. Their average age at Time 1 was 39 (SD = 12), 
ranging between 18 and 67). 
Instruments. At both times, the Schwartz Value Best Worst Survey (SVBWS: Lee, 
Soutar, & Louviere, 2008) was used to measure values
6
. This instrument asks respondents to 
choose the most important and least important values from 11 subsets of Schwartz’s (1992) value 
types, each subset containing six value types, derived from a balanced incomplete block design 
shown in Appendix B. Each value type is represented by the 3 value items with the strongest 
reliability across cultures. In this case, the subsets were created for 11 value types as the 
universalism value was divided into Universalism nature (including the value items of unity with 
nature, protecting the environment and world of beauty) and Universalism social (including the 
value items of equality, world at peace and social justice). Appendix C presents subset 1 as an 
example. This design resulted in each respondent seeing each value type 6 times and each pair of 
value types 3 times. Following Lee et al. (2008), the square root of the best/worst ratio
7
 was 
calculated to produce tradeoff scores that do not require ipsatization.  
Holmes and Rahe’s (1967) scale was used in Time 2 to measure the extent of life 
changing events that had occurred since Time 1. Participants were asked to indicate whether a 
range of life changing events had happened to them since the Time 1 assessment, with each 
event being allocated a number of points indicating the extent to which this event is likely to 
change the participant’s life. Thirty three of the original 43 items were included; ranging from 
the death of a spouse (100 points) to a change in schools (20 points). The 10 excluded items were 
minor life events that were unlikely to elicit value change, such as a change in recreation.  
 Procedure. The surveys were conducted online by a commercial research company as 
part of a larger study into people’s consumption behavior. In this case, there was a time gap of 
approximately two years between Time 1 and Time 2. 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive analysis. Table 4 presents the mean importance and standard deviations of 
the values at Time 1. It also presents the mean value change scores and indicates those values for 
which there was a significant paired mean difference between Time 1 and Time 2.  In this case, 
the mean level change in importance across individuals only increased for hedonism (t(134) = 
2.17, p =.03).  In addition, the longitudinal correlations (test-retest) shown in column 3 indicated 
lower stability than in Studies 1 to 3, which may be attributed to the sample, the longer 
timeframe, differences in life-events or the difference in the measurement device.  
Intra-individual value change. The two-factor principal components analysis of the 
algebraic value change scores explained 33% of the variance. The component plot is shown in 
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Figure 5. Once again, the structure that emerged was similar to the theoretical structure of values. 
It had two deviations from the theoretical structure. One small deviation saw a change in place 
between hedonism and achievement/power. However, this deviation was also evident in the 
value structures in the Time 1 and Time 2 assessments; hence it was in line with expectations. 
The large deviation was in the placement of universalism-social, but not universalism-nature, 
near security. Interestingly, both universalism sub-types were located next to each other in Time 
1 and Time 2, however, security was located closer than expected to Universalism, near to the 
mid-point where the two axes crossed in both time periods. In this case, the change in 
universalism-social (including world at peace and social justice items) was similar to the change 
in the security (including national security and social order items).  And indeed, the algebraic 
difference in universalism-social values was positively correlated with that of security values (r = 
.17, p = .05) whereas the algebraic difference in universalism-nature was not correlated with that 
of security values (r = -.09, NS). It may be that in change in values related to social issues (as in 
the universalism-social and the security values) is experienced similarly in the short term as 
greater social involvement and hence such change occurs in the same direction. However, we 
would expect that in the longer term these changes would occur in opposite directions according 
to the basic motivations that underlie them. 
The confirmatory MDS supported the acceptability of the theory-consistent solution. The 
theory-consistent configuration produced a Stress of .12, which was only slightly larger than the 
unconstrained solution Stress (.09). In addition, the Dispersion Accounted for (DAF) was above 
.98 and Tucker’s Coefficient of Congruence was above .99 for both solutions. Columns 4 and 5 
of Table 4 report the final two-dimensional theoretically-constrained coordinates. The projection 
of points onto parallel lines representing each facet and the regional spacing of the values 
supports Schwartz’s higher order dimensions. While Self-direction and Universalism-
Environment were borderline, their decomposed raw stress was less than .02 in both cases. Thus, 
the rank order value-change data also supported Schwartz’s (1992) general structure.  
Correlates of Value Change 
 The inter-relationships between absolute value-change scores (Time 2 minus Time 1), the 
extent of life changes in the two year period, and age were also examined. We examined their 
relation to overall absolute value change (average absolute difference of all ten value types) and 
to the absolute change in specific value types.  
 Correlations. As expected, the life event score was positively related to overall absolute 
value change (r = .25, p < .01). Hence, experiencing a great extent of life changing events 
contributed to greater value change over the two year period. As expected, age was negatively 
related to overall absolute value change (r = -.15, p = .04). Interestingly, the life event score and 
age were uncorrelated (r = .00, p = .99). It seems life events in the two year period did not vary 
linearly with age. 
Regression. First, the life event score and age were entered into a multiple regression 
model in order to see if they predicted overall absolute value change8. The general predictive 
model was significant (multiple R = .29; F (2,121) = 5.41, p < .01). The extent of life-changing 
events was a significant positive predictor of overall value change (β = .24, t = 2.77, p = .006), 
whereas age was only a marginal negative predictor of change (β = -.16, t = 1.77, p = .08). This 
suggests the extent of the life changes a person experiences is a more crucial factor to value 
change than age. 
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 We also examined whether life events and age predicted the absolute change in the 
eleven specific values. In this analysis we also included the Time 1 value score as a control 
variable, so the influence of life events and age on value-change is independent of their original 
level of value importance. Only one significant prediction was found (tradition - multiple R = 
.57; F (3,120) = 18.94, p < .001). The magnitude of life-changing events was a significant 
positive predictor of the absolute change in tradition values (β = .16, t = 2.11, p = .04), whereas 
age was not significant (β = -.12, t = 1.60, p = .11). In addition, the control variable (tradition 
score at Time 1) was a significant predictor of the change in Tradition (β = .53, t = 7.07, p < 
.001). We also examined the average change in tradition values, rather than the absolute change, 
to see if life-changing events or age produced a directional change in tradition, but the equation 
was not significant.  
What could be the explanation to this pattern of findings? The more impactful the life-
changing event the more it may undermine people’s basic assumptions about life. Hence, a great 
extent of life-changing events may lead the person to challenge tradition values, particularly if 
these values are already quite important. Some people may react by becoming more traditional 
and devout, perhaps responding to the ‘shock’ to the system of basic assumptions by 
strengthening their belief in god who may be seen as responsible to what happened. Others may 
react in the opposite way, by deciding that perhaps there is no god, or that traditional way of life 
is inadequate and therefore should be abandoned. Future research should attempt to replicate this 
finding and test the proposed explanation directly.  
While there was an overall change in values as a function of life-changing events, only 
one of the ten values was identified as consistently changing after the occurrence of life-
changing events. Hence, the main finding of this set of analyses is that although life-changing 
events are predictive of value change, the contents of the values that change are probably not be 
a direct function of the mere occurrence of life-changing events. Rather, the particular values that 
change are probably a function of the nature of the life event, the adaptation required in terms of 
values, and the individual’s interpretation of the life-changing event. 
  
 
General Discussion 
 Values are considered to be relatively stable, although there is some acknowledgement 
that they can change (e.g., Hofmann-Towfigh, 2007; Inglehart, 1997; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
2005b). Yet, the topic of value change has been largely neglected and there are currently no 
published papers on the structure of value change. This paper suggested the structure of intra-
individual value change should mirror the value structure found by Schwartz (1992; 2005a). Four 
longitudinal studies that varied in countries, languages, populations, contexts of change, time 
gaps, and value measures provided consistent support for this argument, suggesting the findings 
are generalizable. Hence, when an intra-individual change in values occurs, it is not random or 
chaotic. Rather, it is organized according to the same conflicts and compatibilities that organize 
values. 
 The heterogeneity of the sample used in Study 4 also enabled us to examine predictors of 
value change. As we expected, the extent of life changing events was positively related to value 
change, supporting the idea that values change when people adjust to a new life situation. This is 
in line with Lewis’s (1997) suggestion that personality change is determined by changes in life 
circumstances. This finding also fits with the recent finding that individuals differ in their 
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trajectories of personality change (Vaidya, Gray, Haig, Mroczek, & Watson, 2008), as 
individuals differed in the values that were changed as a result of life changing events.  
 Interestingly, the effect of life events was larger than the effect age had on value change, 
suggesting the need to adjust to situations impacts more strongly on value change than age. In 
line with this, the literature on change in personality traits has explained the finding of greater 
personality change in young adulthood as stemming from the many changes in the lives of young 
adults, such as taking on new important professional and family roles (Roberts, Walton, & 
Viechtbauer, 2006), implying the crucial factor in personality change is adapting to life changes. 
The weaker effect age had on value change is also consistent with recent findings that, unlike 
previous suggestions that people change little after early adulthood, some personality traits 
change at a faster pace during middle adulthood than in early adulthood (Srivastava, John, 
Gosling, & Potter, 2003).  
Value theory emphasizes the stability of values (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1997). 
Our data confirm this idea as most of the test-retest correlations in our studies would be 
considered high. In the first three studies of high school and university students the correlations 
ranged from .48 to .76, with only one of the 30 correlations being less than .50. In the more 
heterogeneous adult sample, across a longer time period of two years and using a different value 
measure, the correlations were lower, ranging from .26 to .58. A median split using life events in 
this sample, indicated that those who experienced a smaller degree of life changing events had 
higher test-retest correlations, ranging from .36 (power) to .68 (self direction). Nonetheless, we 
suggested that, even if there is only a small change in values, this change is systematic and 
meaningful. The structure of intra-individual value change found across the four longitudinal 
studies supports this proposition, as do the findings about the correlates of value change in Study 
4. This is in line with recent calls to examine the dynamics of personality change, even when 
test-retest correlations are high (Fraley & Roberts, 2005). Future research on value change 
should not be discouraged because of the relative stability of values.  
A consistent deviation from our expectation, occurring in 3 of the 4 studies, was the 
interchange in location of benevolence and universalism value-change. A closer examination of 
the patterns of correlations among the value-change variables revealed a consistent pattern. 
Change in universalism values tended to be negatively correlated with change in self-direction 
values. Moreover, the change in universalism tended to be more negatively related than the 
change in benevolence to all the individualistic values (power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, and self direction; see Schwartz, 1992). This resulted in the location of universalism 
value-change being further away from self-direction and the rest of the individualistic values 
than the theory predicts, leading to the interchange between benevolence and universalism.  
What could explain this pattern of findings? It may be that the transcendence beyond 
selfish interests, which is part of universalism values, seems more blatant in the short run 
compared to the long run. Hence, an increase in the importance of universalism values is 
accompanied by stronger decreases in self-direction and the other individualistic values than 
what would be expected by the Schwartz (1992) theory. Perhaps the salience of the increased 
importance of universalism values such as equality and protecting the environment brings to the 
fore-front practical thoughts about sacrificing one’s convenience in order to pursue these values, 
leading to a reduction in individualistic values. Similarly, decreasing the importance of such 
values may make salient the freedom from restraints to convenient behavior of not needing to 
take the time and effort to protect the environment or treat others fairly. It may be that the shared 
motivation of self-direction and universalism, being reliance on independent judgment and 
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acceptance of diversity (Schwartz, 1992), is less readily salient and takes more time to affect 
people’s value profile, perhaps due to its abstractness.  Future research should examine this 
possibility directly. 
Limitations 
Although we demonstrated consistent results for our proposition, it is important to 
address some possible limitations to the findings. We first address two possible limitations in the 
calculation of our variables, followed by a cross-cultural limitation and the possibility of 
temporary change. 
This paper is unique as no other research was found that has examined the structure of 
naturally occurring longitudinal value change. To do this, we used algebraic difference scores 
across two time periods of varying lengths. While alternatives to difference scores have been 
suggested in the examination of predictive relationships (e.g., Edwards 1994), we have found no 
alternative to the use of these scores in the examination of the structure of change. Further, the 
criticism over using difference scores refers primarily to their use in regression (Campbell & 
Kenny, 1999), which was not the main analysis of the current paper. We did, however, attempt to 
account for the fact that difference scores are likely to be correlated with their terms (Johns, 
1981) in the regression analysis of individual value change (e.g., the change in tradition). To do 
this, we added the Time 1 importance of the tested value as an independent predictor to control 
for the level of importance at Time 1. In addition, we examined the possibility that the value-
change scores were simply a replication of the value structure at Time 1. We used the PERMAP 
computer program (Heady & Lucas, 1997) to check the congruency between two dimensional 
perceptual maps, with and without Time 1 as covariates, as there was no way to do this with the 
principal component analysis reported in this paper. Cliff’s (1966) matching program was then 
used to assess the goodness of fit between the maps, with and without Time 1 as covariates.  In 
all cases, the congruency between maps was high and well above minimal congruency standard 
of .80 suggested by Cliff (1996). This suggests the theoretically consistent value change structure 
was not primarily driven by the starting values structure. 
Three of the four studies used ipsatized scores, which meant changes balanced to zero. 
While it could be argued that this meant a change in one value is necessarily offset by a change 
in another value, there is no reason these changes would follow the theoretical structure of 
values. That is, although the sum of increases in value importance across values should be 
balanced with the sum of decreases in value importance, this does not mean changes in 
theoretically conflicting values would be the ones balanced to zero. Further, the MDS analysis 
used the change in the rank order between Time 2 and Time 1, rather than the change in value 
scores, which is the same with or without ipsatization at the intra-individual level. 
A possible cross-cultural caveat is that the results were limited to respondents from 
Western countries. However, recent studies on longitudinal value change in India found a similar 
pattern, in which mean level increases in self-enhancement values were accompanied by mean 
level decreases in self-transcendence values (Krishnan, 2008). Although we cannot conclude that 
the intra-individual structure of change was the same as that found in the current studies, they 
imply our basic suggestion may also be valid in non-Western cultures. Future research should 
study the intra-individual structure of value change in non-Western cultures to assess the cross-
cultural generality of our findings. 
Finally, our studies included only two times of assessment. It is possible the changes 
observed are fleeting and indicate value fluctuations rather than real value change, as was the 
case in the values change study following the 9/11 attack. Whether value fluctuations should be 
                                                                                              The Structure of Value Change 20
considered as a real change depends on the definition of value change. Bardi and Goodwin 
(2009) defined value change as a change in value scores in a value questionnaire. This definition 
was based on the notion that people know what their values are (see, e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1987). Hence, this definition entails that temporary change in values, such as experimentally 
induced value change, is a real change, albeit temporary. They suggest a theoretical model of 
processes of value change that address temporary changes in values and long-term value change. 
Further, temporary changes in values may be meaningful, as our findings indicate. Future 
longitudinal studies on values with additional times of assessment should be undertaken in order 
to assess meaningful trajectories of value change. 
Implications for Personality Change  
The approach outlined in this paper provides a way to test for systematic change in other 
circumplex models. For example, the circumplex model of interpersonal traits (e.g., Wiggins, 
1979) could be subjected to the same examination as longitudinal change in traits that are part of 
a circumplex should show the same systematic pattern we found. Indeed, the structure of change 
of traits in circumplex models should be even cleaner than the structure we found because many 
traits in such models are antonyms of one another (e.g., cold and warm), whereas there are no 
antonyms in the values model and negative relations between pairs of values are only due to such 
values being based on conflicting motivations. In contrast, other measures of personality, such as 
the Big Five traits, are considered to be independent of one another. Hence, a change in one trait 
should not have any consequences for change in a different trait.  
 
To conclude, the structure of intra-individual value change mirrors the structure of 
values. Hence, although values are relatively stable, they do change occasionally, and such 
change is systematic and meaningful. Therefore, there is scope for studying value change. We 
hope that this research will stimulate further studies that aim to understand the dynamics of value 
change, as well as its antecedents and consequences. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 Seven of the schools were located in different parts of Germany. One of the schools was 
located in the Czech Republic. 521 students were German, 284 students had other nationalities (6 
unknown). 532 students filled in the German version of the questionnaire, 279 students were 
given the English questionnaire. Participants that used questionnaires in different languages or 
that came from different countries did not differ on relevant data, such as demographics, value 
importance, etc. 
2
 The two-dimensional space created by the orthogonal factor analysis is equivalent to the SSA’s 
2-dimensional map, as both methods are based on the same correlations. We chose to use factor 
analysis rather than an SSA due to its greater familiarity for most readers. However, as expected, 
in all four samples the structure of value change using SSA was almost identical to the ones we 
present here using factor analysis. All of the SSA maps are available from the authors upon 
request. 
3
 Initially both centered and uncentered algebraic difference scores from each study were 
submitted to the CIRCUM software (Browne, 1992). The results were promising and very 
similar to those reported by Perrinjaquet, Furrer, Usunier, Cestre and Valette-Florence (2007) for 
the theoretically predicted unequally spaced-unequal communalities solutions. They were also 
similar to the results from entering the Time 1 value scores. However, the lower sample sizes in 
studies 2, 3 and 4 resulted in a number of errors, including Haywood cases which could not be 
resolved with the current data.  
 
4 Given the high proportion of female respondents, we reran the analysis excluding the male 
respondents. The results were very similar, with 37% of the variance being accounted for in the 
two-dimensional solution, which illustrated the same small deviation switch between 
benevolence and universalism and the same large deviation for achievement.  
5 
The female only sample produced very similar results (Stress = .18; DAF = .97 and Tucker’s 
coefficient = .98 for the constrained solution), however benevolence was no longer borderline. 
6
 A more formal discussion of BWS, including formal proofs of the measurement properties 
associated with different cognitive processes that respondents might use to make best and worst 
choices, was provided by Marley and Louviere (2005). 
7
 For value type j: 
SVBWS score v j = ∑ =
S
s
j
j
v
v
Least
Most
S 1
1
  
where  
• v j  is the SVBWS score for the jth value type. 
• v jMost is the weighted sum representing the most important score for the jth value type in a 
set. In the case of six values per set, there are 64 or 2
6
 possible combinations (sets) of the six 
value types. One of these sets is empty, so there are 63 sets in which a choice must be made. If a 
person chooses consistently with their ordering of value types, s/he would choice the most 
important value type in every set in which it appears (i.e., 32 times), the second most important 
value type in every set in which it appears but the most important value type does not (i.e., 16 
times), and so on, eventually choosing the least important value type once. Thus, following Lee, 
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et al. (2008) the value type chosen as most important received a score of 64, the  value type 
chosen as the least important received a score of 1, and the remaining value types received a 
score of 7.5 (or ¼ of the remaining choices 2, 4, 8, 16).  
• Least v j  weighted sum representing the least important score for the jth value type in a set. 
Here, the value type chosen as the least important received a score of 64, the value type chosen 
as most important received a score of 1, and the value types not chosen received a score of 7.5.  
 
8 We also examined the possibility that age and life events may interact, but the moderated 
relationship was not significant. 
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Table 1 
Mean Importance, Longitudinal Correlations, and theory-constrained MDS solution (Study 1) 
Values Mean Importance (STD)  
Longitudinal 
Correlations 
Theoretically-constrained 
MDS dimensions 
 
Time 1 
 
Value 
 
 
Absolute 
Value  
 
Dimension 1 
 
Dimension 2 
Benevolence .64 (.66)  -.08*** .46 .60 .23 .20 
Universalism .27 (.66) -.09*** .44 .62 .32 .60 
Self-Direction .63 (.64)  .04* .45 .58 .06 -.17 
Stimulation .31 (.95)   .04 .59 .65 .85 -.72 
Hedonism .63 (.91)  -.04  .58 .64 .06 -.76 
Achievement -.06 (.85)   .10*** .57 .61 -.84 -.48 
Power -1.03 (1.04)  .19***  .68 .66 -.29 -.25 
Security -.28 (.65)  -.04 .47 .58 -.08 .58 
Conformity -.39 (.84)  -.02 .53 .68 -.35 .63 
Tradition -.82 (.87)    .01 .56 .66 .05 .36 
Note. Value importance is ipsatized by centering on the personal mean importance across all values; the 
significance of paired mean comparisons between Time 1 and Time 2 value importance scores are 
indicated in the value-change mean column (Value ; * p<.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001); value-
change scores are the algebraic difference of Time 2 minus Time 1 value scores; standard 
deviations for the value change scores ranged between .58 for Self Direction to .86 for Power; 
longitudinal correlations are test-retest correlations. 
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 Table 2 
Mean Importance, Longitudinal Correlations, and theory-constrained MDS solution (Study 2) 
Values Mean Importance (STD)  
Longitudinal 
Correlations 
Theoretically-constrained 
MDS dimensions 
 
Time 1 
 
Value 
 
 
Absolute 
Value  
 
Dimension 1 
 
Dimension 2 
Benevolence .78 (.65) -.11* .42 .65 .10 .78 
Universalism .12 (.73) .04 .44 .70 .14 .40 
Self-Direction .47 (.68) -.07 .52 .54 .30 -.22 
Stimulation -.16 (1.08) -.15 .69 .68 .75 .06 
Hedonism .85 (.99) -.15 .77 .53 .66 -.84 
Achievement .34 (.67) -.1 .56 .50 -.36 -.35 
Power -2.16 (1.35) .23* .89 .64 -.11 -.41 
Security -.14 (.74) .1 .55 .53 -.89 .02 
Conformity -.16 (.90) .06 .64 .50 -.46 .38 
Tradition -1.47 (.95) .04 .78 .53 -.15 .17 
Note. Value importance is ipsatized by centering on the personal mean importance across all values; the 
significance of paired mean comparisons between Time 1 and Time 2 value importance scores are 
indicated in the value-change mean column (Value ; * p<.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001); value-
change scores are the algebraic difference of Time 2 minus Time 1 value scores; standard deviations 
for the value change scores ranged between .54 for Benevolence to 1.12 for Power; longitudinal 
correlations are test-retest correlations. 
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Table 3 
Mean Importance, Longitudinal Correlations, and theory-constrained MDS solution (Study 3) 
Values Mean Importance (STD)  
Longitudinal 
Correlations 
Theoretically-constrained 
MDS dimensions 
 
Time 1 
 
Value 
 
 
Absolute 
Value  
 
Dimension 1 
 
Dimension 2 
Benevolence .79 (.73) -.12 .56 .48 .17 .14 
Universalism -.01 (.73)    .10* .40 .76 .39 .55 
Self-Direction .50 (.69)  .08 .44 .64 .29 .02 
Stimulation -.12 (1.13) -.03 .68 .67 .64 -.31 
Hedonism .74 (1.23) .01 .84 .60 .56 -.87 
Achievement .39 (.69) .03 .47 .62 -.47 -.39 
Power -2.02 (1.31)   .19* .83 .70 -.12 -.39 
Security -.06 (.72) -.04 .51 .57 -.49 .77 
Conformity .04 (.69) -.13 .56 .70 -.80 .26 
Tradition -1.39 (1.04) -.05 .71 .66 -.17 .22 
Note. Value importance is ipsatized by centering on the personal mean importance across all values; the 
significance of paired mean comparisons between Time 1 and Time 2 value importance scores are 
indicated in the value-change mean column (Value ; * p<.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001); value-
change scores are the algebraic difference of Time 2 minus Time 1 value scores; standard deviations 
for the value change scores ranged between .51 for Universalism to 1.05 for Hedonism; longitudinal 
correlations are test-retest correlations. 
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Table 4 
Mean Importance, Longitudinal Correlations, and theory-constrained MDS solution (Study 4) 
Values Mean Importance (STD)  
Longitudinal 
Correlations 
Theoretically-constrained 
MDS dimensions 
Time 1 Value 
 
Absolute 
Value  
Dimension 1 Dimension 2 
Benevolence 2.53 (1.55) -.24 1.27 .34 .17 .18 
Uni Social 1.81 (1.41) -.15 .82 .39 .15 .46 
Uni Environ 2.24 (1.58) -.03 1.23 .56 .11 .50 
Self-Direction 2.12 (1.28) .02  .86 .58 .18 .08 
Stimulation 1.43 (1.07) .19  .79 .41 .36 -.84 
Hedonism 1.36 (.92)   .21*  .76 .45 .30 -.50 
Achievement 1.50 (1.28) .14  .85 .45 -.19 -.74 
Power .72   (.76) .08  .54 .26 -.18 -.90 
Security 1.35 (1.02) -.09  .64 .31 -.30 .55 
Conformity 1.87 (1.27) -.18  .87 .43 -.27 .18 
Tradition 1.08 (.86) .05  .64 .37 -.34 1.03 
Note. The significance of paired mean comparisons between Time 1 and Time 2 value importance scores 
are indicated in the value-change mean column (Value ; * p<.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001);value-
change scores are the algebraic difference of Time 2 minus Time 1 value scores; standard 
deviations for the value change scores ranged between 1.78 for Universalism-Environment 
to .98 for Power; longitudinal correlations are test-retest correlations.
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The theoretical structure of values. 
Figure 2. Study 1: Component plot of difference score of values (Time 2 minus Time 1) in a two 
dimensional space. 
Figure 3. Study 2: Component plot of difference score of values (Time 2 minus Time 1) in a two 
dimensional space. 
Figure 4. Study 3: Component plot of difference score of values (Time 2 minus Time 1) in a two 
dimensional space. 
Figure 5. Study 4: Component plot of difference score of values (Time 2 minus Time 1) in a two 
dimensional space. 
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Appendix A 
MDS Constraints to represent Schwartz (1992) theoretical structure 
 Facet 1: 
Self-transcendence to 
Self-enhancement 
Facet 2: 
Conservation to 
Openness to change 
Self-transcendence values 3 2 
Self-enhancement values 1 2 
Openness to change values 2 1 
Conservation values 2 3 
 
                                                                                              The Structure of Value Change 39
Appendix B 
SVBWS Experimental Design  
SVBWS 
Value Types 
Subsets  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Power 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Achievement 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Hedonism 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Stimulation 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Self Direction 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Universalism -
nature 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Benevolence 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Tradition 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Conformity 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Security 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Universalism - 
social 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
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Appendix C 
The first set in the Schwartz Values Best Worst Scale (SVBWS, Lee et al., 2008)  
 
Which is the MOST and Least important factor to you as a guiding principle in YOUR life?  
For more information hold your mouse over any word in each set.  
 
Most  
Important  
 
Least  
Important  
O Successful, capable, ambitious. O 
O 
Protecting the environment, a world of beauty, unity 
with nature. 
O 
O Helpful, honest, forgiving. O 
O Devout, accepting portion in life, humble. O 
O Clean, national & family security, social order.  O 
O Equality, world at peace, social justice. O 
 
 
 
